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Abstract—Auction is a form of organization of competition
that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based
on the information obtained from the competing agents. From
the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource
allocation algorithm applied in the environment with infor-
mation asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and inter-
acting subsystems have different information about the system
as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the histori-
cal development of mathematical theory underlying modern
approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of
the theory are also discussed.
Keywords—auctions, game theory, mechanism design.
1. Introduction
Auctions are used to buy and sell almost anything one can
imagine. Number of categories of items being up for the
Internet auctions at Allegro, Amazon or eBay web sites is
truly astonishing. Auction houses, such as Sothebys, sell
art, antiques, books, jewelry, toys, dolls, and other col-
lectible memorabilia. Securities worth billions of dollars
are regularly auctioned worldwide by the Departments of
Treasury. Directives of the European Parliament recom-
mend application of auctions in awarding of public con-
tracts and coordinating the procurement procedures. Auc-
tions are also widely used to regulate markets of strategic
resources such as electric power or radio spectrum. Re-
cently there have also been many attempts to apply auction
mechanisms to allocate bandwidth in communication net-
works, improve industrial supply chain management and
eﬃciency of allocation of landing and take-oﬀ time slots
in air traﬃc ﬂow management.
One of the reasons for the popularity of auction is that it
provides a convenient way of assigning goods to those who
value them the most. The common auction formats used
in practice to allocate a single object are the English auc-
tion, the Dutch auction, the ﬁrst-price and the second-price
sealed-bid auction. The most popular variant is the English
auction in which the auctioneer calls ascending prices until
there is only one bidder willing to pay. In the Dutch auc-
tion the auctioneer also calls prices, however, he initially
starts from the high level and successively lowers the price
until there is someone willing to pay. In contrast with the
dynamic open bidding formats of the English and Dutch
auctions, the sealed-bid auctions are conducted in a single
step. The auctioneer determines the outcomes based on the
sealed oﬀers submitted by the bidders’. Both in the ﬁrst-
price and the second-price auction the winner is the bidder
with the highest bid. The diﬀerence is in the amount of
money the winner is obliged to pay. In the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion the winner pays his bid. In the second-price auction
the winner pays the second highest bid.
Multiple objects can be sold in a sequence of single-object
auctions or simultaneously. There are three traditional for-
mats of simultaneous multi-unit auctions: discriminatory
(pay-as-bid), uniform and Vickrey auction. In each case
bidders submit to the auctioneer a vector of nonincreas-
ing bids (marginal values), which indicate each bidder’s
willingness to pay for each additional item. In a discrimi-
natory auction a bidder pays the amount of money equal to
the sum of his winning bids, i.e., the sum of those bids that
belong to the set of K highest bids, where K is the number
of goods. In a uniform-price auction all goods are sold
at a market-clearing price, i.e., a maximal price at which
the total amount demanded is greater or equal to the total
amount supplied. In a Vickrey auction, each bidder pays
an amount equal to the externality exerted on others. If
a bidder wins k units of resource, the his payment is equal
to the sum of k highest bids of other bidders (defeated by
his bids) [1], [2].
The choice of a particular auction format has been a vital
problem. On one hand auction may serve as a solution to
many problems of decentralized resource allocation. On
the other, each format suﬀers from drawbacks that may
negatively inﬂuence both eﬃciency of the outcomes and
auctioneer’s revenue. In this paper a historical overview of
selected aspects of auction design is presented. The key
issues that are raised concern contributions of the related
game-theoretic analysis.
2. The Systems Science Perspective
Auction is a form of organization of the competition that
leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on
the information obtained from the competing agents. From
viewpoint of the systems science auction is a distributed
resource allocation algorithm applied in the environments
with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected
and interacting subsystems have diﬀerent information about
the system as a whole. This perspective is taken in the dis-
cussion below. First, a survey of results concerning theory
of competitive equilibrium is presented. This is justiﬁed
by the role it plays in the design of resource allocation
mechanism, even though its assumptions hardly ever cor-
respond to the reality. Second, we refer to the historical
development of the theory of incentives underlying mod-
114
Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective
ern approach to auction design. The theory emerged from
the game theoretic analysis of choices made in distributed
systems under information asymmetry. As a consequence
its models are much more realistic than those derived from
competitive equilibrium theory.
2.1. Competitive Equilibrium Theory
The goal of auction design is to take the advantages of
competition to solve the problem of resource allocation. In
this context the competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium serves
as an aspiration point for the auction design. It is de-
ﬁned as a solution of the system of interaction balancing
(market-clearing) equations according to which preference
maximizing demand equals preference maximizing supply.
Static properties of competitive equilibria and conditions
that guarantee their existence are described by the fun-
damental theorems of welfare economics; see Walras [3],
Wald [4], [5], Lange [6], Arrow and Debreu [7]. Tradition-
ally, they are viewed as formalization of the Adam Smith’s
famous conjecture regarding the invisible hand of market
competition [8]. In essence:
• Pareto-eﬃciency is consistent with individual self-
interest since price-taking behavior is reasonable in
competitive market, especially if the number of de-
cision makers is large [9].
Stability of competitive equilibrium was ﬁrst investigated
by Samuelson. In [10], [11], [12] he surveyed dynamic
models of market-clearing process and examined the rela-
tionship between the conditions for stability of competitive
equilibrium given by Hicks [13] and general conditions for
stability of dynamical systems. Hicks described equilib-
rium as perfectly stable if an increased demand for a good
raises its price even when any subset of other prices is arbi-
trarily held constant. Samuelson showed that this condition
is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for dynamic stability in
Lyapunov sense, except in the case of symmetric matrix
of the partial derivatives of excess demand – a diﬀerence
between the value of demand and supply. An extensive ex-
ploration of dynamic stability of price adjustment process in
perfectly competitive market was later given by Arrow and
Hurwicz [14], [15]. The market price adjustment process,
described by the system of diﬀerential equations deﬁned by
continuous and sign-preserving functions of aggregate ex-
cess demand, is globally stable if the following assumptions
are satisﬁed:
– agents maximize rational, continuous, monotone and
strictly convex preferences,
– agents’ preferences are commonly known,
– agents are price-takers (do not anticipate equilibrium
prices),
– aggregate demand satisﬁes the (weak) axiom of re-
vealed preferences and has the property of gross sub-
stitution.
General treatment of the suﬃcient conditions for the sta-
bility of competitive equilibria was also given by Uzawa
in [16], [17], [18]. Extensive study of price-based hierarchi-
cal control methods was given by Findeisen et al. in [19],
as well. Saari and Simon [20], [21], on the other hand,
investigated local stability of competitive equilibria. They
noticed that there is a tradeoﬀ between global stability con-
ditions and information required by the price adjustment
procedure to converge to local equilibrium. In particular,
they considered Newton algorithm as a price adjustment
process and studied the information content it requires for
convergence.
Applications in telecommunication. Perhaps the most
impressive recent application of competitive equilibrium
theory is the design of telecommunication protocols for
congestion control. As an illustration of the general ap-
proach one can consider the uniform-price auction mech-
anism proposed by Kelly [22]. Transmission rates of the
traﬃc sources in the computer network are gradually ad-
justed until their willingness to pay for the introduced con-
gestion equals the corresponding congestion cost. In this
model each link in the network acts as an auctioneer, it
adjusts its individual congestion price until the demand for
the link resources equals the supply. See Srikant [23] and
Low [24], [25], [26] for details.
Attractiveness of this approach relates to the common sense
of competitiveness of the network environment. Indeed,
telecommunication networks consist of a large number
of similar traﬃc sources (characterized by similar prefer-
ences) controlled by the same telecommunication protocols.
Therefore, the assumptions of competitive equilibrium the-
ory may be regarded as a reasonable description of the traf-
ﬁc exchange process. If all traﬃc sources calculate trans-
mission rates taking the congestion signals (link prices) as
given, then the ﬁxed point of the traﬃc exchange process
can be established in competitive equilibrium maximizing
the eﬀectiveness of network utilization. This observation
has served as a justiﬁcation for the design of several recent
TCP congestion control algorithms.
2.2. Theory of Incentives
Clearly, assumptions of the competitive equilibrium model
are not satisﬁed in most real-life settings. Namley, economy
is rarly a complete system of markets (in which every agent
is able to exchange every good with every other agent), ex-
ternalities are present (prices do not reﬂect the full costs
or beneﬁts), common property resources exist in economy
(consumption of such good by one individual does not re-
duce availability of the good for consumption by others,
no one can be eﬀectively excluded from using the good),
decision makers anticipate prices, information is imperfect
and time delays cannot be ignored, etc. From the engi-
neering point of view model inadequacies of this sort can
be recognized as a potential source of system distress; see
e.g. Stiglitz [27] and Mas-Colell [28].
The shortcomings and failures of competitive equilibrium
theory inspired the search for a much more sophisticated
115
Michał Karpowicz
models. General solutions to the resource allocation prob-
lems arising in the systems with information asymmetry
emerged from the investigations of incentives motivating
individuals in decision making. Historically they related to
the three streams of thought: theory of market socialism,
social choice theory and theory of competitive markets;
see e.g. Green, Laﬀont and Tirole [29], [30]. Currently, the
obtained results are included in the theory of incentives
(principal-agent models) and mechanism (or game) design
theory.
Theory of market socialism, co-founded by Polish
economist Oskar Lange in 1930’s [31], postulated central-
ized control in order to reach predeﬁned goals of the econ-
omy. The responsibility assigned to the central planner was
to determine the values of coordination variables: prices,
production inputs and outputs. These were then applied to
control performance of local industrial organizations [32]:
(...) a market mechanism could be estab-
lished in a socialist economy which would lead
to the solution of the simultaneous equations
by means of an empirical procedure of trial
and error. Starting with an arbitrary set of
prices, the price is raised whenever demand
exceeds supply and lowered whenever the op-
posite is the case. Through such a process of
tatonnements, first described by Walras, the fi-
nal equilibrium prices are gradually reached.
These are the prices satisfying the system of si-
multaneous equations. It was assumed without
question that the tatonnement process in fact
converges to the system of equilibrium prices.
(...) Let us put the simultaneous equations on
an electronic computer and we shall obtain
the solution in less than a second. The mar-
ket process with its cumbersome tatonnements
appears old-fashioned. Indeed, it may be con-
sidered as a computing device of the preelec-
tronic age.
It seems evident that not only the problem of incentives
was ignored but also there was a belief that a government
agency could glean and process all the relevant information
required to make an economy function well. In practice,
on one hand the constraints were imposed on production
outputs, but, on the other, the government either provided
insuﬃcient inputs or provided more than it was necessary.
As a result, with severe conﬂicts concerning personal free-
dom and civil rights in the background, the economy strode
towards the state of constant struggle to realize production
plans. Strategic manipulations to outwit the system, both
in order to meet predeﬁned goals of the economy of pub-
lic goods and to satisfy privately deﬁned interests, arose
naturally in eﬀect of recurring coordination failures. In-
eﬃciency of directly coordinated system was largely due
to incompatibility of the private interests and goals of the
central planner. To assure that they coincide proper in-
centives were required. However, as it quickly became
apparent, without suﬃcient autonomy, private property or
the proﬁt motive, putting democratic procedures aside, in-
centives were lacking. System’s collapse was inevitable.
An interesting debate revealing important historical back-
ground of the discussed issues can be found in [33]. See
also Stiglitz [27], [34].
Social choice theory is concerned with the problem of ratio-
nal aggregation of preferences within the collective decision
rules, including voting systems and competitive markets.
Its central result, due to Arrow [35], shows that necessary
conditions that preference aggregations should be expected
to meet are inconsistent and cannot hold together:
If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal
comparisons of utility, then the only methods
of passing from individual tastes to social pref-
erences which will be satisfactory [i.e. will not
reflect individuals’ desires negatively and the
resultant social tastes will be represented by
an ordering having the properties of rational-
ity ascribed to individual orderings] and which
will be defined for a wide range of sets of in-
dividual orderings are either imposed or dic-
tatorial.
As it can be noticed, the key concern that motivated the re-
lated work grew out of the observation that the concept of
preference aggregation, by its very nature, deals with the
problem of interpersonal comparisons and measurability
of preferences’ intensity. The focus on ordinal preferences,
which was largely due to the inﬂuential arguments that no
common denominator of feelings is possible [36], was an
attempt to eschew the related controversies. Unfortunately,
Arrow’s impossibility theorem demonstrated that there are
other substantial diﬃculties that arise as an unavoidable
trade oﬀ – the impossibility result is the price for the incom-
parability requirement. In an immediate response it was
therefore proposed, mostly due to Sen [37], [38], [39], that
informational constraints imposed on the collective choice
rule should be modiﬁed. The line of argumentation was
taken that the results of preference aggregation should be
invariant with respect to the utility signals that provide the
same information in terms of the applied notion of measur-
ability and interpersonal comparisons. Consequently, the
counterargument gained strong support that the notion of
ordinal preferences is inadequate for representing conﬂicts
of gains and losses. These conﬂicts, however, inevitably
occur in many collective choice settings, especially when
welfare judgments are involved and the resource constraints
are present. When dealing with the considerable number of
social choice situations, interpersonal comparisons of inten-
sity of preferences, or weights of interests, provide desirable
informational basis for the determination of decision. Con-
ditions imposed on the social choice function by Arrow’s
theorem may be interpreted as necessary but not suﬃcient
for collective choice. On the other hand, cardinality and
full interpersonal comparability of individual welfare units
are suﬃcient but not necessary for rational choice under
aggregate welfare maximization. To generate a complete
and transitive aggregation of orderings (preferences) their
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partial comparability is suﬃcient as well; see Arrow [35]
and Sen [40] for details. In essence, social choice theory
shows how to design a satisfactory procedure for prefer-
ence aggregation. However, it is not concerned with the
question if the aggregated preferences, revealed by the in-
teracting agents, are true or not. This observation inspired
investigations of the gaming aspect of collective decision-
making, commonly observed in many votings and auctions.
Finally, the concept of incentive-based regulation arose as
a potential remedy to the wide scope of imperfections of
the markets traditionally designed within the framework of
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. Spectacular
examples intensively discussed in the literature include the
global depression of the 1930s, East Asia ﬁnancial cri-
sis in the late 1990s and California Power Exchange col-
lapse in 2001. The following macroeconomical comment
by Stiglitz [27] emphasizes signiﬁcance of the related issues
and places them in somewhat wider perspective of market
design for developing economies:
even if Smith’s theory were relevant for ad-
vanced industrialized countries, the required
conditions are not satisfied in developing coun-
tries. The market system requires clearly estab-
lished property rights and the courts to enforce
them; but often these are absent in developing
countries. The market system requires compe-
tition and perfect information. But competition
is limited and information is far from perfect –
a well-functioning competitive markets cannot
be established overnight. The theory says that
an efficient market economy requires that all
of the assumptions be satisfied. In some cases
reforms in one area, without accompanying re-
forms in others, make actually matters worse.
(...) economic theory and history show how
disastrous it can be to ignore sequencing.
Ineﬃciencies arising under asymmetric and imperfect infor-
mation were ﬁrst studied by Stiglitz [41]–[43], Akerlof [44]
and Spence [45]. For general results see [30].
The above considerations eventually gave rise to the the-
ory of incentives and game design. Its contributions, and
especially its rigorous game-theoretic analysis of the in-
centive compatibility concept introduced by Hurwicz [46],
have deepened the knowledge regarding the possibility for
achieving Pareto-optimal allocations in decentralized sys-
tems and designing eﬃcient auctioning procedures. The fol-
lowing results are often viewed as the most inﬂuential [9]:
• When a delegation of tasks occurs within the ﬁrm,
then because of asymmetric information the ﬁrm
does not maximize its proﬁt, i.e., allocative ineﬃ-
ciency occurs.
• In markets of private and public goods with a ﬁnite
number of agents, there are no nonparametric mech-
anisms (which process only the information received
from the agents) that simultaneously yield Pareto-
eﬃcient allocations and provide individual agents
with incentives to report their true preferences hon-
estly.
• In markets of private and public goods with a ﬁnite
number of agents, there are nonparametric mecha-
nisms that yield Pareto-eﬃcient allocations when all
agents follow their self-interest by playing a Nash-
equilibrium strategy.
• In the bilateral trade problem, there is no mechanism
that yields eﬃcient allocations, provides individual
agents with incentives to report their true preferences
honestly, guarantees proﬁtable participation and cov-
ers the costs of allocations.
Applications in telecommunication. If the assumption of
price-taking behavior is dropped, then in most cases com-
petitive equilibria cannot be reached by means of the decen-
tralized price-based coordination methods, such as uniform-
price auctions. This problem was recently investigated in
the networking context by Johari [47]–[49]. The major re-
sult of his work, focused on the mechanisms of price-
anticipating bidding, demonstrates that there exist imple-
mentations of the uniform-price auctions generating out-
comes with bounded loss of eﬃciency. An interesting con-
clusion is also due to Roughgarden [50], [51]. Namely, the
ratio of eﬃciency loss, arising in the networks as a con-
sequence of the price-anticipating behavior, is independent
of network topology. Following the similar line of argu-
ment, Yang and Hajek [52], [53] analyzed the undesirable
performance of the algorithm proposed by Kelly [22]. In
the settings with strategic bidders competition for network
paths is dominated in terms of eﬃciency by competition for
the network links (that form the paths). Finally, suﬃcient
conditions for eﬃciency of auctions in the environments
with price-anticipating agents has been given by Karpo-
wicz in [54].
Anticipation of price eﬀects has been recognized in the
literature as an urgent problem of dynamic interconnec-
tion management in communication networks. Consider
a group of interconnected network service providers (ISPs)
exchanging IP traﬃc between their autonomous systems.
The basic observation that one can make about this re-
source allocation setting suggests that local decisions con-
cerning bandwidth allocations can have a non-negligible
inﬂuence on the overall network performance. As a result,
ISPs may anticipate the eﬀects of their actions on inter-
connection prices and view these prices as functions of
the actions of all interrelated providers. Clearly, in such
an environment routing and congestion control protocols
applied locally by ISPs can be subject to strategic manipu-
lations. Records of such strategic interactions can be found
in the archives of the Polish Oﬃce of Electronic Commu-
nications (www.uke.gov.pl). For more general treatment of
problems related to competition in telecommunications, es-
pecially from the viewpoint of interconnection agreements,
such as peering and transit, and interconnection pricing,
see Laﬀont and Tirole [55], Laskowski [56], Norton [57],
Baake and Wichmann [58].
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3. Auction Design and Game Theory
In order to beneﬁt from allocating resources by means of
an auction it is necessary that its rules be designed and
tailored to the particular allocation setting. To cope with
the complexity of this multistage design process it is there-
fore reasonable to apply convenient modeling tools. Game
theory, a branch of applied mathematics, plays an impor-
tant role in this context. It is a study of mathematical
models of interaction (competition or cooperation) of in-
telligent and rational (in a speciﬁed sense) agents making
interrelated choices under incomplete (asymmetric) infor-
mation [30], [59], [60]. On one hand, it aims at providing
answers to some of the essential questions regarding prop-
erties of diﬀerent auction formats. On the other, it provides
recommendations for the design of resource allocation and
pricing rules deﬁning games that are characterized by the
desired features.
Properties of outcomes generated by auctions were ﬁrst
identiﬁed by means of game-theoretic analysis in the semi-
nal work of Vickrey [61]. Its major conclusions were based
on the following observation: information about demand
and supply, revealed by the competing agents and used
to determine the outcomes, inﬂuences the market clearing
price, thus encouraging agents to submit price-anticipating
bids. As a consequence, investigation of the incentives that
agents may have to submit
an unbiased report of the marginal-cost (com-
petitive supply) curves (...) and of the
marginal-value (competitive demand) curves
(...), or at least of the portions of these curves
covering a range of prices that will be sure to
contain the equilibrium price,
became the main theme of the auction (game or mecha-
nism) design theory [1], [2], [60]. Major contributions in
this ﬁeld are due to Hurwicz [46], [62]–[66], Myerson [59],
[67], [68] and Maskin [69]–[73]. An overview of selected
historical attempts to apply the theory in practice is given
below.
3.1. Treasury Bill Auctions
An inﬂuential investigation of the adverse eﬀects of strate-
gic bidding in auctions of shares was presented in the paper
by Wilson [74]. It demonstrated existence of bidding strate-
gies that may lead to the reduction of sale price, which in
eﬀect reduces revenue of the resource manager, even with
the increasing number of agents placing their bids. The
result given by Wilson was next generalized by Back and
Zender [75] in the context of the auction of U.S. Trea-
sury bills. Conclusions presented in their paper served as
an argument in the debate regarding the merits of diﬀerent
formats of multi-unit auctions that the Treasury could apply
for the sale of securities.
Traditionally the discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction was
used, according to which all bidders whose oﬀers exceed
the market-clearing price (determined by the auctioneer)
are obliged to pay their bids. However, in 1960s sugges-
tion came from Milton Friedman that in order to improve
revenues the Treasury should consider switching to the
uniform-price format. Back’s and Zender’s paper supported
the resulting debate with the formal arguments against any
unconditional and simpliﬁed recommendations. In particu-
lar, it warned against extrapolation of properties of auctions
with single unit demand to the more general situations of
multi-unit demand. Interestingly, it was not until recently
that the equilibrium properties of the multi-object uniform-
price auctions have been thoroughly investigated. The gen-
eral result was obtained by Ausubel and Cramton [76]. It
relates potential ineﬃciency of the uniform-pricing scheme
outcomes to the fact that the scheme creates strong incen-
tives for demand reduction: each agent’s optimal strategy
is to shade bids for units of resource other than the ﬁrst
one; since bids placed on the other units determine the ﬁ-
nal (clearing) price with positive probability, agents may
increase their proﬁts by submitting lowered marginal val-
ues. (From the viewpoint of the supply side of the system,
the result implies increased marginal production costs re-
vealed to the auctioneer.) The similar result is also given
in [77].
Indeed, revenue implications of the potential underpricing
has become the subject of intensive studies in the context
of Treasury auctions. From 1992 to 1998 the U.S. Trea-
sury, motivated by various academic conjectures and mar-
ket manipulation scandals (in 1991 a major trader in the
U.S. Treasury securities admitted that it had violated auc-
tion rules by submitting fraudulent bids [78]), experimented
with the sealed-bid uniform-price auctions for selling two-
year and ﬁve-year notes. Eventually it switched entirely
to the uniform price format in the end of 1998. The goal
was to verify whether incentives to shade bids would be
reduced with uniform pricing rule, which in turn would
improve revenues to the Treasury. The experiment did not
provide strong support for this conjecture. The impact on
revenues of the two pricing formats was demonstrated by
Malvey and Archibald [79] to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
Umlauf [80] and Tenario [81], on the other hand, slightly
favor the uniform pricing scheme using data from the Mex-
ican Treasury auctions and Zambian foreign exchange auc-
tions, respectively. One can view this conclusions as con-
sistent with the results of Ausubel and Cramton [76], and
Back and Zender [75], which state that the ranking of the
two formats is inherently ambiguous. There are cases which
show that uniform-price format outperforms in both eﬃ-
ciency and revenue the pay-as-bid format in the particular
auction setting, and results which show the reverse. This
also seems to correspond to the well known result of the
theory of single-object auctions; for models that include
both aﬃliation (log-supermodularity of densities) of bid-
ders’ valuations and risk aversion, the ﬁrst- and second-
price auctions of single-objects cannot be generally ranked
by their expected prices [1], [82].
Another important result is due to Keloharju, Nyborg and
Rydqvist [83] who give an extensive exploration of histori-
cal data from the Finnish Treasury auctions. On one hand,
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their ﬁnding is that individual bidders’ demand increases
with number of bidders, which is consistent with the ar-
gument that bidders exercise market power. On the other
hand, however, statistical data show that equilibria with ex-
tremely low prices, e.g. predicted by Wilson [74], usually
do not occur in practice. The similar conclusion was given
by Nyborg and Sundaresan [84] and Goldreich [85]. The
practical reason why bidders do not coordinate on the rev-
enue reducing low price equilibria is the strategic behavior
of the auctioneer himself. By determining the amount of
securities sold in response to the submitted collection of
bids, imposing restrictions on the bidding procedures and
revealing suﬃcient amount of information, the Treasury
eﬀectively protects itself against revenue reduction. This
advocates the important result of auction design theory –
games induced by the rules of allocation mechanisms are
played not only between the agents but between the agents
and the mechanism designer as well.
3.2. Electric Power Auctions
Both discriminatory and uniform-price auctions have also
been used in the electricity markets. Interesting exam-
ples come from Scandinavia, UK and France. Norway,
Sweden, Finland and Denmark buy and sell electricity on
the Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool, which has been
the world’s only multinational exchange for trading elec-
tric power since 1990s [86], [87]. Since 2001 in the UK
electricity generators sell their output on daily basis in the
discriminatory auctions, after the switch from the uniform-
price format originally adopted in 1990 [88]. The uni-
form pricing scheme had also been used in the Califor-
nia Power Exchange before its collapse in 2001. Electric-
ité de France (EDF) gave an undertaking to the European
Commission in early 2001 to give access to generation ca-
pacities in France in the form of contracts conveying the
right to purchase energy. Currently contracts with dura-
tions between 3 and 48 months are being sold at pay-as-
bid auctions conducted approximately every 3 months; see
www.edf.com.
Bidding behavior in the electric power auctions has been
a growing concern, as it may be related to prices be-
ing increased above competitive levels [89]. An intensively
studied real-life example that servers as a support of this ar-
gument relates to the collapse of the electric power market
in California where the uniform-price auctions were used
to buy electricity on the power exchange. It is believed that
the strategic bidding of the suppliers, extracting the highest
possible electricity prices, was among the causative factors
of the crisis in the summer of 2000 [90], [91]. Indeed,
many mathematical models have been developed to explain
and prevent events of this sort. Research that are of great in-
terest in this context concerns especially the ways in which
suppliers’ bidding manipulations aimed at improving prof-
its may inﬂuence allocations of energy production. Indeed,
knowledge of the related threats has been playing a role in
adjusting regulatory policy around the world. For example,
Green and Newbery [92], [93] applied the supply function
equilibrium approach, originally introduced by Klemperer
and Meyer [94], to show that markups on marginal costs
may be constituted by the Nash equilibrium of the game
induced by the British electricity spot market. Von der
Fehr and Harbord [95] reached the similar conclusion with
the sealed-bid auction model. However, they also showed
that if supply signals are step functions, as it usually is
in practice, pure-strategy equilibria do not exist for a wide
range of demand distributions. Other results along this line
include works of Cramton [96], [97], Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn [98], [99], Baldick and Hogan [100], Day and
Hobbs [101], just to name a few examples.
3.3. Spectrum Auctions
The design of spectrum auctions for the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) in the United States1 is often
regarded in the literature as one of the most successful ap-
plications of game theory. In fact, Milgrom [2] argues that
it was the design that started the era of putting the theory
to work.
The primary goal of the FCC was the maximization of
economic eﬃciency of spectrum allocation – licenses were
to be assigned to those who are capable of providing bet-
ter services at lower costs. Designers confronted with the
regulatory goals turned to game theory for methodological
support. Its recommendations narrowed the set of admis-
sible solutions by pointing out the threats related to the
expected bidding strategies [2], [102], [103]. Theoreti-
cal models also guided the development of experimenta-
tion scenarios testing the applicability of the key design
judgments [104], [105]. The following conclusions deter-
mined the ﬁnal auction format:
Open bidding is better than a single sealed bid.
Open bidding process reveals information about valuations
of goods and provides feedback increasing auction rev-
enues [1], [106].
Simultaneous open bidding is better than sequential auc-
tions.
Sequential auctions of goods requires agents to condition
their decisions on the future actions of others. This guess-
work is in practice very likely to reduce eﬃciency of the
auction. With simultaneous bidding much of the guesswork
is eliminated [1].
Package bids (combinatorial auctions) are too complex.
Once bidding for a combination of goods is admitted, in-
eﬃciencies are likely to arise due to threshold problem,
a variant of the free-rider problem. The transparency of
auction is weakened as well [102], [103], [107].
As a result the simultaneous multiple-round ascending-bid
auction was proposed, a multi-object version of the En-
glish auction. According to its rules, a number of licenses
is auctioned simultaneously in discrete, successive rounds.
In every round, a bidder can bid (oﬀering a buy price)
1This application of mechanism design theory was indicated by Prof.
Eric Maskin in the telephone interview following the announcement of
the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics.
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on any license subject to constraints given by the activity
rules and bidder’s eligibility deﬁned by the upfront pay-
ment. Open bidding format gives each bidder information
about the highest bids, identities of bidders, their upfront
payments and handicaps. The auction stops if a single round
passes in which no new bids are placed on any license. Li-
censes are sold for the price equal to their highest standing
bid [2], [102], [103].
Auction rules implemented by the FCC proved its eﬃ-
ciency in series of spectrum auctions and became a world-
wide standard. It should be noticed, though, that they did
not eliminate the incentives for strategic bidding, poten-
tially decreasing eﬃciency of allocations. Cramton and
Schwartz [108], [109] described several cases of bid sig-
naling that occurred in FCC auctions and identify it as
an example of proﬁtable collusive behavior – incentives
for tacit collusion were especially strong among incum-
bents and large bidders capable of exerting their market
power. Consequently, the experiences gained in practice
have guided evolution of the auction. In response to the ob-
served problems many design recommendations have been
given to reduce the eﬀectiveness of signaling and collusion,
e.g., by concealing bidders identities, oﬀering preferences
(handicaps) for small businesses and new entrants, increas-
ing reserve prices, bounding supply by oﬀering licenses that
are harder to split up, allowing package bidding. Again,
game-theoretic considerations have been often applied in
the examination of the reﬁnements.
4. Final Remarks
Game theory has been helpful in explaining bidding be-
havior in diﬀerent auction settings. In some cases its qual-
itative predictions have turned out to be inﬂuential enough
to aﬀect the regulation policies. The examples presented
above may serve as an evidence of its contributions. On the
other hand, however, the very same studies unveil its weak
points. Clearly, relevance of its recommendations depends
on the particular decision setting.
In reality eﬃciency of auction outcomes depends on many
factors that often dominate any inﬂuence that a particular
allocation or pricing rule may have. Issues that are faced
by the auction designer in practice, often playing more im-
portant role than the rules of an auction, are listed below.
Auction items. One of the key design problems is re-
lated to the choice of an object to be put up on auction.
Whether it is divisible or indivisible, homogeneous or het-
erogeneous may have a decisive inﬂuence on the allocation
process. This stems from the fact that a particular deﬁni-
tion of an allocation determines preference proﬁle of the
competing decision makers. Empirical and theoretical ev-
idence show that rules of auction may be irrelevant under
particular allocation deﬁnitions.
Auction participants. It is essential to deﬁne who is el-
igible to participate in an auction and what approvals are
required. As pointed out by Milgrom [2], marketing a sale
is often the biggest factor in its success. Announcement of
an auction or deﬁnition of a resource allocation procedure
must provide information targeted to potential participants
enabling them to study the opportunity.
Flexible goals. Auctions are conducted to achieve speciﬁc
economic goals – typically, maximization of eﬃciency of
allocations or maximization of auctioneer’s revenue. How-
ever, because of the complexity of the auctioning process
adjustments are often required. In fact, in many cases it
may be reasonable not to conduct an auction, e.g., because
of the overall performance of the economy or insuﬃcient
legislative support.
Interactions. What to allocate to agents depends on their
demand, which depends on who agents are, which in turn
may depend on the way the auction is conducted. Deci-
sions made by auction designer are not independent [2].
Interactions occur between agents as well. There are many
occasions for them to cooperate before, during and after
the auction. Collusion and mergers clearly have a signif-
icant inﬂuence on the outcomes, as well as possibility of
reallocation after the auction.
Information. What information is required to determine
allocations and ﬁnal payments, and what information is re-
vealed to agents may play a decisive role. One of the key
motivations for pricing resources by means of an auction
is gaining information about agents’ privately known valu-
ations and preferences. Under auction bidding process it is
not only the resource manager but also agents themselves
that are responsible for the ﬁnal price and allocation of the
resource. Related guesswork is therefore distributed be-
tween auction designer and auction participants. On the
other hand, the responsibility for resource allocation out-
comes inevitably creates incentives for agents to manipulate
the process. Information about reserve prices, bidding in-
crements, agents’ eligibility revealed before the auction, as
well as information about submitted bids revealed during
the auction may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence competition, bidding
behavior and eﬃciency of outcomes, especially if agents’
valuations are interdependent.
To solve at least some of the problems of auction design
one may settle the judgments on game-theoretic models ap-
proximating the auction outcomes. However, any reasoning
should be extremely careful and substantiated by experi-
mental veriﬁcations of the dominating factors, since arbi-
trary estimations and behavioral assumptions are inevitable
in this context.
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